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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case 
This case began as a simple breach of contract action brought by Triad Leasing & 
Financing, Inc. ("Triad") against Rocky Mountain Rogues, Inc., James Blittersdorf and Glenna 
Blittersdorf-Christofferson (collectively "Rocky Mountain") due to Rocky Mountain's failure to 
make payments on a forklift it financed through Triad. Rocky Mountain then expanded the 
scope of the action to include claims of breach of contract, fraud and violations of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act against both Triad and the vendor of the forklift, Alan McRae, 
individually, d/b/a Lund Machinery ("Lund'). 
B. Course of proceedings 
On August 8, 2006, Triad filed its breach of contract complaint against Rocky Mountain. 
(Clerk's Record at 9.) Rocky Mountain answered the complaint and filed claims against Triad 
and Lund alleging breach of contract, fraud and violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, 
J.C. §48-601 et seq. (R. at 38). Upon Lund's summary judgment motion and after holding a 
hearing, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order dismissing each of Rocky 
Mountain's claims, on November 7, 2007. (R. at 75.) The court entered its final judgment in 
favor of Lund on March 31, 2008. (R. at 97). 
After a bench trial on all claims and counterclaims between Triad and Rocky Mountain, 
the court issued it Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in favor ofTriad and 
dismissing Rocky Mountain's counterclaims, on February 14, 2008. (R. at 88.) The court 
entered its judgment in favor of Triad on February 27, 2008. (Rat. 94.) 
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Rocky Mountain filed a motion for mistrial and motions to reconsider both judgments. 
(Rat 7). The court denied all of Rocky Mountain's post trial motions on July 31, 2008. (R. at 
104.) Rocky Mountain then filed its appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. (R. at 117.) 
C. Statement of additional facts 
In May 2003, Lund entered into a rental agreement with Rocky Mountain whereby Lund 
Machinery contracted to rent to Rocky Mountain a forklift for use on Rocky Mountain Rogues' 
property. (R. at 75.). This agreement continued into 2006. (Id.) 
In 2006, Lund agreed to sell the previously rented forklift to Rocky Mountain. (Id.) 
Rocky Mountain financed the purchase by entering a lease agreement with Triad. (Id. at 75-76.) 
In addition to the forklift, a bucket and jib boom (attachments to the forklift) were included as 
collateral. (R. at 13). 
The Equipment Lease Contract between Triad and Rocky Mountain Rogues was entered 
into on March 15, 2006. (Id.) James Blittersdorf agreed to pay $1406 per month for a period of 
sixty months (Id.). Blittersdorf and his wife guaranteed the payments. (Id.) An employee of 
Lund delivered the Triad contract to Rocky Mountain and collected a check as a deposit. (R. at 
76) 
The Lease Contract states: 
Lessee [Rocky Mountain Rogues] understands and agrees that Lessor [Triad) shall have 
no obligation to pay for the Equipment until Lessee has "accepted" the Equipment and 
Lessor has accepted the Lease at their office. By signing below, Lessee specifically 
authorizes Lessor to accept an Oral Acceptance from Lessee. 
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(R. at 13.) Below this paragraph, a line states, "Oral Acceptance taken by:" and is signed by a 
Triad agent on March 20, 2006. (Id.) In addition, Joseph Leslie with FCI Financial Services, 
Inc., an equipment financing brokerage used by Triad (R. at 78., n. 2) verified Blittersdorf's 
receipt of the equipment. (R. at 13). 
Paragraph 4(b) of The Triad contract states: 
4. NO RIGHT TO CANCEL AND OTHER IMPORTANT TERMS OF THE 
LEASE. You agree as follows: 
(b) THE LESSOR IS NOT RELATED TO MANUFACTURER(S) OR 
VENDOR(S) ... WE ARE NOT RELATED IN ANY WAY TO THE 
VENDOR(S) ... NEITHER THE VENDOR(S) NOR ANYONE ELSE IS AN AGENT OF 
OURS ... 
(Rat 13). Rocky Mountain Rogues agreed to the above quoted terms when fact when it signed 
the Lease Contract on March 15, 2006. (Rat 13.) 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court properly refuse to hear Rocky Mountain's motion to 
reconsider where Rocky Mountain failed to schedule the motion for hearing? 
B. Did the district court properly determine, as a matter of law, neither the terms of 
the contract 11.or agency theory created liability for Lund? 
C. Did the district court properly find that Rocky Mountain failed to establish a 
fraud claim against Lund? 
D. Is Lund entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
HI. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Lund should be granted attorney fees on appeal. Idaho Appellate Rule 41 allows a party 
to affirmatively seek attorney fees on appeal. IDAHO APP. R. 41 (2009). A basis for attorney fees 
must be presented in the first appellate brief filed by the party in order to avoid waiving the claim 
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for attorney fees. IDAHO APP. R. 35(b)(5)(2009). 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides for the award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in 
a civil action relating to commercial transactions. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 12-120(3 )(2008). The 
statutory definition of a commercial transaction is defined as "all transactions except transactions 
for personal or household purposes." Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 
136 Idaho 466,470, 36 P.3d 218,222 (2001). In order to be entitled to attorney fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 120(3), two requirements must be met. Id. at 471, 36 P.3d at 223. First, there must 
be a commercial transaction that is integral to the claim. Id Second, "the commercial 
transaction must be the basis upon which recovery is sought. Id As such, "the commercial 
transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute a basis on which the party is attempting 
to recover." Id. Moreover, Idaho Code § 12-120 (3) "mandates an award of attorney fees on 
appeal as well as in the trial court." Fox v. Mt. W Elec., 137 Idaho 703, 712, 52 P.3d 848, 857 
(2002). 
In this case, Idaho Code § 120(3) authorizes the award of attorney fees to Lund, in the 
event Lund is the prevailing party. First, Rocky Mountain's financing and purchase of the 
forklift for use in its business constitutes a commercial transaction. Second, all claims, 
counterclaims and third-party claims were based on the financing agreement that enabled Rocky 
Mountain to purchase the forklift. 
Lund is also entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code §12-121, which authorizes the 
award of attorney fees when an appeal is pursued "frivolously, unreasonably, and without 
foundation." Electrical Wholesale Supply Co. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814,828, 41 P.3d 242,256 
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(2001). When an appeal simply invites the appellate court to second-guess the trial court's 
factual findings which are supported by substantial evidence or presents no meaningful issues of 
law, the appeal is considered frivolous under Idaho Code § 12-121. Id. 
In this case, Rocky Mountain presented no material facts to support his claims against 
Lund. Nor has Rocky Mountain presented a novel legal issue or shown that the district court 
misapplied the law to the facts of the case. As such, attorney fees are warranted under Idaho 
Code §121. 
For the above stated reasons, Lund is entitled to full, reasonable attorney fees, pursuant to 
Idaho Code §12-120(3), 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41, in the event Lund is deemed the 
prevailing party on appeal. Additionally, as the prevailing party, Lund would be entitled to costs 
as matter of course pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 40. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
As this Court has recently stated: 
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for [the 
appellate court court] is the same standard used by the district court in ruling on the 
motion. Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). A mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt is not sufficient 
to create a genuine issue of material fact. The nonmoving party must submit more than 
conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to withstand summary 
judgment. However, [the appellate court] will construe all disputed facts and reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. If there is no genuine issue of material fact, 
"only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review. 
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Mendenhall v. Aldous, _Idaho_, 196 P.3d 352, 354 (2008)(intemal citations and quotations 
omitted) . 
.B. The district properly refused to hear Rocky Mmmtain's motion to reconsider where 
Rocky Mmmtai1111 failed to schedule the motion for hearing. 
Counsel for Rocky Mountain asserts that the district court led him to believe that Rocky 
Mountain had pending claims against Lund at the time of trial and directs the Court's attention to 
a particular segment of the trial transcript. Appellate Brief at 19. However, if the referenced 
passage is put in context of the entire transcript, it becomes clear that the district court was 
addressing Rocky Mountain's oral motion, made on the day of trial, to have its motion for 
reconsideration heard that day. (Trial Transcript at 32:18 -33:34.) 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(2)(b) provides: 
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be 
made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen 
( 14) days after the entry of the final judgment. A motion for reconsideration of 
any order of the trial court made after entry of final judgment may be filed within 
fourteen (14) days from the entry of such order. 
Rocky Mountain's motion to reconsider was subject to the general rules governing 
motions, affidavits and briefs, under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b )(3). Rule 7(b )(3)(D) 
provides "If argument has been requested on any motion, the court may, in its discretion, deny 
oral argument by counsel by written or oral notice to all counsel before the day of the hearing, 
and the court may limit oral argument at any time." Idaho R. Civ. P. 7(b )(3)(0)(2009). Because 
Rocky Mountain had never requested a hearing on its motion, the district court did not set the 
matter for hearing. In turn, the district court properly declined to hear the motion without having 
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the motion properly scheduled and noticed. (Trial transcript at 63: 19 -64:3. )1 
Moreover, in reviewing the record it is clear that neither Lund's motion nor the district 
court's order limited the summary judgment proceedings to Lund's role as an agent of Triad. 
(See e.g. Reporter's Transcript on Appeal at 2:11 - 15 (MR SCHUSTER: ... "We have filed this 
motion for summary judgment because we feel we are entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
on ... the third-party plaintiffs claims that are before the court.); see also R. at 75-81. 
Memorandum Decision and Order (providing no indication that the grant of summary judgment 
is limited to Lund's role as an agent of Triad)). 
C. The district court properly found Lund had no contractual liability to Rocky 
Mountain because Lund was neither a party to the contract nor an agent of Triad. 
On appeal, Rocky Mountain appears to assert that its third-party complaint pied a breach 
of contract claim against Lund based on a separate contract that was entered "before Triad was 
involved." Appellant's Brief at 19. Rocky Mountain further claims that the district court never 
ruled on this claim in its summary judgment order. Appellant's Brief at 19. However, in 
reviewing Rocky Mountain's third-party claim against Lund it is clear that the breach of contract 
claim alleged against Lund was based on the contract between Rocky Mountain and Triad. 
The complaint alleges that Lund arranged for Triad to finance the purchase of the 
equipment, made certain representations about the terms of the financing contract and therefore 
became a party to the contract with Triad (R. at 62, if54.) Rocky Mountain's complaint goes on 
to repeatedly allege "McRae/Lund individually and in concert with Plaintiffs caused the breach 
1 The district court also questioned Rocky Mountain's ability, and subsequent failure, to subpoena Lund employees 
to testify as fact witnesses in its case against Triad. (Trial Transcript at 36: 18 -37:17). 
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of contract. .. " (Rat 62, 1154-56.) Accordingly, the parties and the district court addressed 
Lund's contractual liability to Rocky Mountain under the terms of the Triad contract, or 
alternatively, under agency theory. (R. at 79). The district court properly found that Lund was 
neither a party to the contract nor an agent of Triad. (R at.79). 
Rocky Mountain based its claims on the Equipment Lease Contract and Purchase 
Equipment Agreement it entered with Triad. (R. at 10, 13-15.) Both of these documents identify 
the parties to the contract as Triad Leasing & Financial, Inc. as the Lessor, Rocky Mountain 
Rogues, Inc. as the lessees and Mr. and Mrs. Blittersdorf as the Guarantors ( R. at 13-17.) Lund 
does not appear anywhere in the contract documents as a party to the contract. Accordingly, the 
district court properly found that Lund assumed no obligations under the contract. (R. at 79.) 
Moreover, Lund cannot be made a party to the contract under agency theory. Paragraph 
4(b) of the contract states in bold-faced type, "NEITHER THE VENDOR(S) NOR ANYONE 
ELSE IS AN AGENT OF OURS." (Rat 13.) Just above Mr. Blittersdorfs signature on the 
contract, it states "[t]his is a binding contract. It cannot be cancelled. Read carefully before 
signing." (Id.) 
The objective in interpreting contracts is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the 
parties. Twin Lakes Village Property v. Crowley, 124 Idaho 132, 135, 859 P.2d 611,614 
(1993 )(internal citation omitted). The intent of the parties should, if possible, be ascertained 
from the language of the documents. Id (internal citation omitted). When a document is clear 
and unambiguous, the interpretation of its meaning is a question of law. Carl H Christensen 
Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 873 993 P.2d 1197, 1204 (1999). The 
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determination of whether a document is ambiguous is itself, a question of law, which is resolved 
by "examining the document's relevant provisions to determine whether the contract is 
reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations "reasonably subject to conflicting 
interpretation." Teterling v. Payne, 13 I Idaho 389, 392, 957 P.2d 1387, 1390 (1998). 
The terms of the contract are not subject to conflicting interpretation. Instead, the 
contract unambiguously puts Rocky Mountain on notice that it was dealing with Triad 
exclusively and that Triad had no agency relationship with Lund. 
Moreover, even if the Court were to consider evidence beyond the unambiguous 
language of the document, the agency claim still fails. Agency is a fiduciary relationship in 
which a principal confers authority upon an agent to act for the principal. Gissel v. State, 111 
Idaho 725, 728, 727 P.2d 1153, 1156 (1986) (internal citations omitted). As the Court has stated 
in Gissel, agency can be established in three ways: 
Id. 
First, real or express authority -- an expression by the principal, either written or oral, 
granting authority to the agent to act; Second, implied authority -- the principal acts in 
such a manner which leads the agent to believe that he has authority to act for the 
principal. Third, apparent authority -- acts by the principal involving third parties who 
are conversant with the business practices of the principal, whereby a reasonable person 
would be led to believe that the agent has authority to act for the principal. The party 
alleging the existence of an agency relationship carries the burden of proof. 
Rocky Mountain has provided no evidence supporting that an agency relationship was 
ever created. To the contrary, Rocky Mountain admits that its agency claim is based on nothing 
more than Rocky Mountain's assumptions. At the summary judgment hearing, counsel for 
Rocky Mountain stated: 
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Essentially, Your Honor, its our belief that there was·an agency relationship between 
Lund and Triad .... My client. .. was 1111der the impression that Lund and Triad were one and the 
same. (Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, 17: 16 - 21.)(emphasis added). 
*** 
[Rocky Mountain] assumed Lund and Triad were one and the same. He's simply a guy from 
Alpine, and he assumed they were one and the same entity ... (Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, 
20:2- 5.) (emphasis added). 
The assumptions and unsubstantiated impressions of Rocky Mountain do not create 
genuine issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. For all of the above 
stated reasons, the district court properly granted Lund's motion for summary judgment on the 
contract claims. 
D. The district court properly dismissed Rocky Mountain's fraud claim against 
Lund on summary judgment because Rocky Mountain failed to present the 
elements of a prima facie case. 
Rocky Mountain argues the district court erred by dismissing Rocky Mountain's fraud 
claim against Lund. Rocky Mountain specifically challenges the district's court's ruling that any 
alleged representation that a check would not be cashed constituted future promises rather than 
existing facts and therefore could not support a claim of fraud. (Appellant's Brief at 21.) 
However, the court's dismissal of Lund's claim was proper because Rocky Mountain failed as a 
matter of law to establish a prima facie case of fraud. 
Fraud claims must be pied with particularity. I.R.C.P. 9(b). The primafacie case of fraud 
consists of: (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of 
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its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent that it should be acted on by the person and in 
the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) his reliance on 
the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; and (9) his consequent and proximate injury. Dengler v. 
Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 Idaho 123, 127, 106 P.3d 449,453 (2005). A party alleging 
fraud "must support the existence of each of the elements of the cause of action for fraud by 
pleading with particularity the factual circumstances constituting fraud. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade 
Corp., 141 Idaho 233,239 108 P.3d 380,387 (2005)(emphasis added). Each element of fraud 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence; it will never be presumed. Thomson v. 
Marks, 86 Idaho 166,177,384 P.2d 69, 75-76 (1963). 
Rocky Mountain argues that Lund committed fraud by representing that the $5,600 check 
made payable to Triad would not be cashed and that a bucket would be used as the security 
deposit instead. (Appellant's Brief at 21 ). Rocky Mountain further argues the alleged 
representations constituted an existing fact and not a future promise. (Id.) 
The district court supported its dismissal of the fraud claim by finding any alleged 
statements regarding the status of the check would have constituted a promise of future events 
rather than a misrepresentation of existing facts. (R. at 80). The district court relied primarily on 
First Security Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Gaige, 115 Idaho 172, 765 P.2d 683 (1988). In Gaige, the 
defendant argued that the express language of a personal guaranty allowing for unconditional 
recourse against the defendant should not have been enforced because it did not represent "the 
real deal," and that a loan officer fraudulently induced him to sign a personal guaranty by stating 
that the signature was a formality promising that the bank would seek recourse against the 
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company before enforcing the guaranty. Gaige, 115 Idaho at 175, 765 P.2d at 686. The Court 
found that the loan officer's representations "were at best promises of future performance and, as 
such, could not form the basis of a fraud claim to defeat First Security's right to enforce [the 
guaranty]." Id 
Rocky Mountain alleges Blittersdorf was told the check was needed merely to create "a 
paper trail," (Appellant's Brief at 23.) This alleged statement is indistinguishable from the type 
of representations made in Gaige. The alleged representation was essentially that the check was 
needed as a formality ( a "paper trail") and would not be cashed in the future. 
Rocky Mountain does not distinguish the facts in case at bar from Gaige. Instead, Rocky 
Mountain directs the Court to Gillespie v. Mountain Park Estates, LLC, 142 Idaho 671, 132 
Idaho P.3d 428 (2006). (Appellant's Brief at 22.) In Gillespie, the court recognized two 
exceptions to "general rule that fraud cannot be based upon the mere failure to perform a 
promise." 142 Idaho at 431, 132 Idaho at 671. The exception cited by Rocky Mountain applies 
when "the promise was accompanied by statements of existing fact which show the promisor's 
ability to perform the promise and those statements were false." Id ( emphasis added). 
Rocky Mountain argues that Lund's alleged promise not to cash the check is not only a 
statement of existing fact, but that it evidences Lund's ability to perform the promise and 
therefore may be the basis for fraud under the cited exception. (Appellant's Brief at 23). Rocky 
Mountain then argues Lund could perform in holding the disputed check "because it had done so 
in the past," under a 2003 rental agreement between Lund and Rock Mountain. (Id.) 
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This argument falls flat for two reasons. First, the terms of the earlier rental contract are 
irrelevant to the obligations created by the financing agreement between Triad and Rocky 
Mountain. They were two distinct transactions between two different parties. Second, there 
was no indication that Lund had any ability to prevent the check from being negotiated. The 
contract was between Triad and Rocky Mountain and the check was made payable to Triad only. 
Where Lund was not a payee, it was given no authority to negotiate or prevent the check from 
being negotiated. 
Similarly, any alleged statement that the bucket would be used as security in lieu of 
cashing the check, even if assumed to be a statement of existing fact, does not establish Lund's 
ability to perform. Again, Lund was not a party to the contract and the contract gave Lund no 
authority to determine what would be used as a security deposit. (see R. at 13.) Moreover, the 
contract clearly states that the security deposit is to be $5,000. (Id.) It makes no reference to the 
bucket as security. (Id.) The express language of the contract put Rocky Mountain on notice 
that Lund could not perform on the alleged promises. 
Rocky Mountain fails to establish that the exception set forth in Gillespie applies to the 
case at bar. Accordingly, the general rule that "fraud cannot be based upon statements 
promissory in nature that relate to future actions or upon mere failure to perform a promise or an 
agreement to do something in the future," (Gillespie, 142 Idaho at 674, 132 P.3d at 431) governs 
the disposition of this action. In tum, the district court properly found that the alleged promise to 
refrain from cashing check could not support Rocky Mountain's fraud claim against Lund. 
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Moreover, the district court correctly stated that the alleged statements cited by Rocky 
Mountain are inadmissible under the parole evidence rule. (R. at 80.) The parole evidence rule 
prohibits the "introduction of prior oral negotiations which contradict or vary the terms of a 
completely integrated writing." Gaige, 115 Idaho at 175-76, 765 P.2d at 686-87. As previously 
addressed under the express terms of the contract (1): Rocky Mountain and Triad are the only 
parties to the contract; (2) Lund as the Vendor was not an agent of Triad; (3) Rocky Mountain 
was obligated to provide a security deposit of $5,000 to Triad. (R. at 13). Any representation 
that the bucket would serve as security rather than the $5,000 deposit would contradict or vary 
the terms of the contract. Moreover, any suggestion that Lund had the authority to negotiate on 
behalf of Triad would also contradict the express terms of the contract. As such, the district 
court properly found that the alleged statements on which Rocky Mountain purportedly relied 
could not support its fraud claim. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court properly dismissed all of Rocky Mountain's 
clams against Lund. Accordingly, Lund respectfully requests that the Court affirm the district 
court's grant of summary judgment, affirm the district's denial of Rocky Mountain's motion to 
reconsider and award Lund's attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
Dated: April 13, 2009. 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
chuster 
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